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INCOME DYNAMICS AND LIFE-CYCLE INEQUALITY:
MECHANISMS AND CONTROVERSIES*
Richard Blundell
This study focuses on the transmission of inequality over the working life. A model of constrained
intertemporal choice is used to provide structure to the distributional dynamics of wages, earnings,
income and consumption. The mechanisms used to insure labour market shocks are examined in a
partial-insurance setting where the manner and scope for insurance depends on the access to credit,
the information available to consumers and the durability of income shocks. Drawing on recent
research, family labour supply, the credit market and the tax system are all shown to play a key role.
These mechanisms vary in importance across different points of the life cycle and the business cycle.
Economic inequality has many linked dimensions. Labour economists typically focus
on inequality in hourly wages or earnings, public economists on disposable income
and wealth and household economists on consumption. These different dimensions
capture different aspects of inequality, and analysed together they can considerably
enhance our understanding of inequality dynamics. The link between the various
measures of inequality is mediated by multiple ‘insurance’ mechanisms. These
mechanisms include credit markets, labour supply, taxation, welfare benefits, formal
insurance, informal gifts, transfers etc.
The objective of the research reported in this article is to use the framework of
constrained intertemporal choice over consumption, saving and family labour supply
to provide a structure for the distributional dynamics of wages, earnings, income and
consumption. Here, we focus on the evolution of inequality over the working life. At
the heart of this analysis is the study of labour income dynamics. The dynamics of
labour income and wages are the foundation for thinking about the transmission of
inequality over the life cycle. It is the key to exploring the mechanisms used by families
to ‘insure’ against labour market shocks.
The definition of insurance adopted in this work is very broad. It covers formal and
informal mechanisms that are used to attenuate the impact of shocks to earned
income. These mechanisms will vary in importance across different types of
households at different points of their life cycle and at different points in the business
cycle. The manner and scope for insurance depends on the access to credit, the
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information available to consumers and the durability of income shocks. To contrast
empirical observation with the standard incomplete markets self-insurance model, a
general partial-insurance framework following Blundell et al. (2008) is used in which
transmission parameters between income shocks and consumption growth indicate the
degree of insurance.
In one of the foundation studies in this area, Deaton and Paxson (1994) noted that
an implication of the permanent income hypothesis was that, for any birth cohort,
inequality of consumption and income should grow with age. Examining survey data
on income and consumption from a wide range of countries, they found this to be
true. The income variance will increase with permanent income shocks and the
variance of consumption will also cumulate permanent income shocks. The degree to
which these move in line will depend on the degree of precautionary savings and access
to credit. This was a key insight for the subsequent work in this field. Recent evidence
on the growth in consumption inequality over the life cycle for different birth cohorts
in the UK and the US shows a strong increase in inequality across cohorts. Younger
birth cohorts face higher overall consumption inequality during their working life than
similarly aged older cohorts. Figures 1 and 2 show the striking evidence from the UK1
and from the US2 respectively. Income inequality growth displays some similarities, but
a clearly different pattern; see Figure 3 for the UK, for example.
The aim of this study is to look behind these Figures and investigate the linkages that
underlie these inequality measures. Understanding the importance of labour market
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Fig. 1. Variance of Log Non-durable Consumption by Age, UK
1 I am grateful to Cormac O’Dea for these Figures from the expenditure data (FES and EFS) for Britain.
See Brewer and O’Dea (2012) for further description and data sources.
2 I am grateful to Luigi Pistaferri for these Figures from the expenditure data (PSID and CEX) for the US.
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shocks over the working life and uncovering the mechanisms that link these measures
of inequality across the lifetime of each birth cohort is a key motivation for this
research.
This study attempts to bridge three literatures. The first concerns the examination of
the evolution in inequality over time for consumption and income.3 This leads us
naturally to a second set of literature which concerns the panel data dynamics of
income. Typically, this literature has focused on the variance decomposition of male
earnings.4 Finally, there is the literature on intertemporal consumption decisions
under uncertainty, especially those which examine excess sensitivity and partial
insurance.5 Recently, there has also been growth in an important and directly related
literature on information, family labour supply, learning and human capital.6
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Fig. 2. Variance of Log Non-durable Consumption by Age, US
3 In particular, studies from the BLS in the US, comprehensively summarised in Johnson et al. (2005). This
work emanated from the important early work by Cutler and Katz (1992). In the UK, Blundell and Preston
(1995) provided a comparison of income and consumption inequality, focusing on the strong inequality
growth episode of the 1980s highlighted in the work of Atkinson (1999) and earlier references therein.
4 Foremost among these are the studies by Lillard and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy
(1982), Abowd and Card (1989), Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995, 2002), Baker (1997), Haider (2001), Meghir
and Pistaferri (2004), Haider and Solon (2006), Guvenen (2009), Browning et al. (2010), Altonji et al. (2013)
and DeBacker et al. (2013). In terms of the durability of income shocks, the path-breaking work is the Moffitt
and Gottschalk (1994) study of US male earnings.
5 Among the key works are Hall and Mishkin (1982), Campbell and Deaton (1989), Cochrane (1991),
Deaton and Paxson (1994), Townsend (1994), Attanasio and Davis (1996), Blundell and Preston (1998),
Krueger and Perri (2004), Heathcote et al. (2004), Storesletten et al. (2004), Krueger and Perri (2006),
Heathcote et al. (2007), Attanasio and Pavoni (2011), Blundell et al. (2008), Primiceri and Van Rens (2009),
Low et al. (2010), Guvenen and Smith (2012) etc.
6 Including Pistaferri (2003), Cunha et al. (2005), Cunha et al. (2007), Guvenen (2007), Kaufmann and
Pistaferri (2009), Huggett et al. (2011) and Blundell et al. (2012).
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The layout of the remainder of the article is as follows. The next Section examines
the key ingredients of labour market dynamics. Section 2 develops the linkage between
these models and intertemporal models of consumer behaviour. Models of partial
insurance are considered in Section 3 and some summary empirical results are
presented. Section 4 looks at the role of family labour supply as an additional
insurance mechanism. Robustness issues are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6
concludes with a summary of what has been learned so far, drawing out some
directions for future research.
1. Some Panel Data Income Dynamics
There is an extensive applied econometrics literature modelling income dynamics
using the extensive panel data now available for most modern economies. The focus in
this article is on non-stationarity and on the persistence of shocks. These are some of
the key components of labour income dynamics as they impact on consumption and
saving decisions.
A convenient general specification of log income yi,a,t( lnYi,a,t) for consumer i of
age a in time period t with observable characteristics Zi,a,t is given by
yi;a;t ¼ B0i;a;t fi þ Z 0i;a;tuþ yPi;a;t þ yTi;a;t ; (1)
where yPit is a persistent process of income shocks which adds to the individual-specific
trend (by age and time) B0i;a;t fi and where y
T
it is a transitory shock represented by some
low-order MA process. A key consideration is to allow variances (or factor loadings) of
yP and yT to vary with age and time for each birth cohort. Of course, not all three effects
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Fig. 3. Variance of Log Disposable Income by Age, UK
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can be identified without restrictions. A simple way to extract these effects is to assume
common life-cycle age effects and time effects, across cohorts.
For any cohort, a reasonably general specification for the idiosyncratic effects B0i;t fi ,
which we explore further below, is given by
B0i;t fi ¼ f0i þ pt f1i ; (2)
where f 0i is an individual effect, and pt is some time (or age) trend so that ptf 1i
represents an idiosyncratic trend.
Suppose yTi;t is represented by a low-order MA(q)
vit ¼
Xq
j¼0
hjei;tj with h0  1; (3)
and yPit by
yPit ¼ qyPit1 þ fit : (4)
Suppose also that we assume the deterministic term Z 0i;tu is already removed from yi,t,
the dynamic panel data income model becomes
yi;t ¼ pt f1i þ f0i þ yPi;t þ
Xq
j¼0
hjei;tj ; (5)
as implemented in Blundell et al. (2014), for example.
If q = 1, then this implies a key quasi-difference moment restriction
covðDqyt ;Dqyt2Þ ¼ varðf0Þð1 qÞ2 þ varðf1ÞDqptDqpt2  qh1varðet2Þ; (6)
where Dq=(1  qL) is the quasi-difference operator. For large q = 1 and small h1, (6)
implies
covðDyt ;Dyt2Þ ’ varðf1ÞDptDpt2: (7)
Consequently, for near unit root permanent shocks and innovation transitory
shocks, if we set the individual trends to zero (var( f 1) = 0), there are no autocovari-
ances of order two or above remaining in the growth rates of the income variable y.
Allowing for a higher MA process relaxes this; but at some point, the autocovariance
structure for income growth drops to zero. This observation is a key source of
identification in ‘permanent–transitory’ panel data models of income dynamics
(MaCurdy 1982; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004, 2011).
1.1. Idiosyncratic Trends
But what of idiosyncratic trends? The trend term ptf 1i in (5) could take a number of
forms. Two alternatives worth highlighting are as follows:
(a) deterministic idiosyncratic trend:
pt f1i ¼ rðtÞf1i ;
where r is a known function of t, e.g. r(t) = t, and
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(b) stochastic trend in ‘ability prices’:
pt ¼ pt1 þ nt :
with Et1ξt = 0.
Evidence points to cases where each of these could be of key importance.
Deterministic trends, as in (a), appear most prominently early in the working life
(Haider and Solon, 2006) and for the higher educated (Blundell et al., 2014). Formally,
this is a life-cycle effect, an age effect for any birth cohort. The earlier in the career we
select individuals in a panel and the higher their education the more likely this is to be a
dominant effect.7 Alternatively, stochastic trends, as in (b), are most likely to occur
during periods of technical change when skill prices are changing across the unobserved
ability distribution. Formally, this is a calender time effect within any labour market.
A key question in relation to (b) is how many skill price factors do we need?
Heckman and Scheinkman (1987) show that maybe many such terms are required.
In any panel data study sampled from a large disparate economy like the US or the UK,
it may prove difficult to identify skill prices in local labour markets. For such panel
data studies, a stochastic trend, represented in the permanent idiosyncratic shock term
(4), may provide a good approximation.8 As we will see these considerations have
important implications for the distribution of consumption growth rates.
1.2. The Permanent–transitory Model of Income Dynamics
As a simple representation of non-stationary income dynamics for each household i,
the permanent–transitory decomposition provides a useful baseline. We rewrite (5) as
yit ¼ yPit þ yTit (8)
with
yPit ¼ yPit1 þ fit (9)
and transitory or mean reverting component, yTit ¼ vi;t
vit ¼
Xq
j¼0
hjei;tj with h0  1: (10)
This formulation implies a restrictive structure for the autocovariances of
Dyit( = fit + Dvit)
covðDyt ;DytþsÞ ¼ varðftÞ þ var ðDvtÞ for s = 0cov ðDvt ;DvtþsÞ for s 6= 0.

(11)
Allowing for an MA(q) process, for example, adds q  1 extra parameter (the q  1
MA coefficients) but also q  1 extra moments, so that identification is unaffected.
7 For example, Blundell et al. (2014) find idiosyncratic age trends to be important only for those with
college education.
8 This would contrast to the study of a sample from a specific high-skill profession data (scientists, for
example) as used in the innovative early study by Lillard and Weiss (1979). See also Lillard and Willis (1978).
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It seems reasonable that the variance of shocks to income, especially more
permanent shocks, should be largest at either end of the working life. At the
beginning of the working life, individuals are sorting themselves into occupations and
firms that best suit their human capital resulting in positive and negative longer term
‘surprises’. At the end of the working life, health shocks are likely to become more
relevant.
We can see this process taking place most clearly in studies that use detailed lifetime
profiles from population register panel data. Figures 4 and 5 are derived from a study
of income dynamics from the Norwegian Population Register Panel as analysed in
Blundell et al. (2014). The Figures plot the variances of the permanent shocks to
labour market income and disposable income for men during their working life. The
second Figure separates out the low-educated group and shows the strong increase in
the variance of permanent shocks at older working ages for this group. Indeed, this
study suggests that the overall U shape for variances over the life cycle may reflect an
aggregation over high-educated workers, whose shocks are largest earlier their lifetime,
and low-educated workers, who face larger variances to persistent income shocks later
in their working life.
1.3. Some (Simple) Empirics of Income Dynamics
To examine the ability of the permanent–transitory income model to provide a good
representation of income dynamics in the UK and the US, Tables 1 and 2 present
the autocovariance structure of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in the US, PSID
and the British Household Panel Study in the UK (BHPS) respectively. These tables
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Fig. 4. Variance of Permanent Shocks by Age, Norway
Source. Blundell et al. (2014).
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suggest that the latent factor structure (11) aligns ‘well’ with the autocovariance
structure of income in both of these panel data sets. In addition, there is evidence of
non-stationary behaviour with the variances changing over time.9 However, there is
little evidence of autocovariances extending much beyond the first order. For the
PSID data, the test that cov(Dyt+1, Dyt) = 0 for all t, has a p-value of 0.0048; for the
t + 2 term, it is 0.0125 and for the t + 3 and t + 4 terms, the p-values are 0.6507 and
0.9875 respectively.
Why may it be hard to detect idiosyncratic trends? To a large extent it is probably a
matter of the age selection used.10 As noted above, forecastable components and
differential trends are most important early in the life cycle. Tables 1 and 2 use samples
where the head is male, lives in a couple and prime aged (aged between 30 and 60
years). Such a selection largely removes the early career trends and the later career
health effects. Moreover, the baseline specifications (8)–(10) allow for general fixed
effects and initial conditions. Indeed, this structure is easily extended to account for
higher moments, and a regular deconvolution argument can be used to show
identification of variances and complete distributions of the factors, see Bonhomme
and Robin (2010).
A key point is to allow for non-stationarity. In this identification/estimation
approach, the variances (or factor loadings) of the permanent and transitory factors
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Fig. 5. Variance of Permanent Shocks by Age (Low Educated), Norway
Source. Blundell et al. (2014).
9 The UK BHPS data start in 1992 and therefore misses the large increase in inequality during the 1980s,
see Blundell and Preston (1998).
10 Indeed, as noted above, the Blundell et al. (2014) population register study finds that idiosyncratic
trends are only significant for the young and high-educated group.
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are permitted to vary non-parametrically with cohort, education and time. Indeed, the
relative variance of these two factors is a measure of persistence or durability of labour
income shocks. This is what drives the changing relationship between the dispersion of
income and consumption.
2. Intertemporal Choice and the Evolution of the Consumption Distribution
2.1. Self-insurance
Recall that the main objective of the research described in this article is to uncover the
transmission of inequality from earnings to consumption over the working life. To
provide a underlying economic framework for thinking about this, a model of
constrained intertemporal consumer choice with partial insurance is developed in this
section.
As a baseline specification of the household consumption decision, suppose that at
time t each household i maximises the conditional expectation of the discounted
stream of time separable, differentiable utility:
max
C
Et
XTt
j¼0
utðCi;tþj ;Zi;tþjÞ;
Table 1
The Autocovariance Matrix of Income Growth PSID
Year var(Dyt) cov(Dyt+1,Dyt) cov(Dyt+2,Dyt)
1980 0.0832 0.0196 0.0018
(0.0089) (0.0035) (0.0032)
1981 0.0717 0.0220 0.0074
(0.0075) (0.0034) (0.0037)
1982 0.0718 0.0226 0.0081
(0.0051) (0.0035) (0.0026)
1983 0.0783 0.0209 0.0094
(0.0066) (0.0034) (0.0042)
1984 0.0805 0.0288 0.0034
(0.0055) (0.0036) (0.0032)
1985 0.1090 0.0379 0.0019
(0.0180) (0.0074) (0.0038)
1986 0.1023 0.0354 0.0115
(0.0077) (0.0054) (0.0038)
1987 0.1116 0.0375 0.0016
(0.0097) (0.0051) (0.0046)
1988 0.0925 0.0313 0.0021
(0.0080) (0.0042) (0.0032)
1989 0.0883 0.0280 0.0035
(0.0067) (0.0059) (0.0034)
1990 0.0924 0.0296 0.0067
(0.0095) (0.0049) (0.0050)
1991 0.0818 0.0299 NA
(0.0059) (0.0040)
1992 0.1177 NA NA
(0.0079)
Source. Blundell et al. (2008).
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where Zi,t+j represents taste shifters, demographic non-separabilities and discount rate
heterogeneity. The retirement age, set at L, is assumed known and certain, as is the end
of the life cycle at T(> L).
Individuals can self-insure using a credit market with access to a risk-free bond with
real return rt+j. Consequently, in this simple credit market framework, consumption
and income are linked through the intertemporal budget constraint
Ai;tþjþ1 ¼ ð1þ rtþjÞðAi;tþj þ Yi;tþj  Ci;tþjÞ with Ai;T ¼ 0: (12)
With self-insurance and constant relative risk averse (CRRA) preferences
utðCi;tþj ;Zi;tþjÞ  1ð1þ dÞ j
Cbi;tþj  1
b
eZ
0
i;tþj#; (13)
the first-order conditions become
Cb1i;t1 ¼
1þ rt1
1þ d e
DZ 0i;t#tEt1C
b1
i;t :
Building on the studies of Campbell (1993) and Blundell and Stoker (1999),
Blundell et al. (2013) derive a general approximation for consumption growth for this
self-insurance model given by
Table 2
The Autocovariance Matrix of Income Growth BHPS
Year var(Dyt) cov(Dyt+1,Dyt) cov(Dyt+2,Dyt)
1980 0.1429 0.0504 0.0044
(0.0071) (0.0042) (0.0039)
1981 0.0717 0.0220 0.0074
(0.0075) (0.0034) (0.0037)
1982 0.0718 0.0226 0.0081
(0.0051) (0.0035) (0.0026)
1983 0.0783 0.0209 0.0094
(0.0066) (0.0034) (0.0042)
1984 0.0805 0.0288 0.0034
(0.0055) (0.0036) (0.0032)
1985 0.1090 0.0379 0.0019
(0.0180) (0.0074) (0.0038)
1986 0.1023 0.0354 0.0115
(0.0077) (0.0054) (0.0038)
1987 0.1116 0.0375 0.0016
(0.0097) (0.0051) (0.0046)
1988 0.0925 0.0313 0.0021
(0.0080) (0.0042) (0.0032)
1989 0.0883 0.0280 0.0035
(0.0067) (0.0059) (0.0034)
1990 0.0924 0.0296 0.0067
(0.0095) (0.0049) (0.0050)
1991 0.0818 0.0299 NA
(0.0059) (0.0040)
1992 0.1177 NA NA
(0.0079)
Source. Blundell and Etheridge (2008).
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Dci;t ’ DZ 0i;t#0t þ gi;t þ Ci;t ; (14)
where ci,t  DlogCi,t, #0t ¼ ð1 bÞ1#t , gi,t is a consumption growth shock with
Et1gi,t = 0, Γi,t captures any slope in the consumption path due to interest rates,
impatience or precautionary savings and the error in the approximation is OðEt1g2i;tÞ.
Conveniently, with CRRA preferences, Γi,t is independent of Ci,t.
2.2. Linking the Evolution of the Consumption and Income Distributions
For log income growth in the permanent–transitory model (9, 10) we have
Dyi;tþk ¼ fi;tþk þ
Xq
j¼0
hjei;tþkj : (15)
The intertemporal budget constraint (12) can be written as
XTt
k¼0
QtþkCi;tþk ¼
XLt
k¼0
QtþkYi;tþk þ Ai;t ;
where Y is the level of income, T is death, L is retirement and Qt+k is appropriate
discount factor
Qk
i¼1ð1þ rtþiÞ, k = 1,. . .,T  t (and Qt = 1).
Define
pi;t ¼
XLt
k¼0
QtþkYi;tk
XLt
k¼0
QtþkYi;tk þ Ai;t ; (16)
the share of future labour income in current human and financial wealth, and
ct ’
r
1þ r 1þ
Xq
j¼1
hj

ð1þ r Þ j
" #
(17)
the annuity factor (for rt = r).
Blundell et al. (2013) show that the stochastic individual element gi,t in consumption
growth (14) is approximated by
gi;t ’ pi;t fi;t þ cLtei;t
 
;
where
pit  Human wealthit
Assetsit þ Human wealthit
and cLt is the annuity value of a transitory shock for an individual aged t retiring at age
L. A link between consumption growth and the income shocks can be expressed, to
order O(‖mt‖
2), where mt = (ft,et)
0
, as
D lnCit ﬃ Cit þ DZ 0ituc þ pitfit þ pitcLteit þ nit : (18)
As the expression for p suggests, when assets are close to zero, permanent shocks flow
completely into consumption in this self-insurance model. Outside the credit market,
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there are no additional mechanisms in this simple framework for insuring labour
market shocks.
Each of the terms on the rhs of (18) captures key factors in the determination of
intertemporal consumption growth. In particular, Γit reflects impatience, precaution-
ary savings, intertemporal substitution; DZ 0itu
c captures deterministic preference shifts
and labour supply non-separabilities; pitfit measures the impact of permanent income
shocks. The pitcLteit term measures the impact of transitory income shocks, where
cLt < 1 is the annuitisation factor. Finally, ξit allows for the impact of shocks to higher
income moments, etc.11
As noted above, the degree of self-insurance is reflected in the p parameter (16),
which corresponds to the ratio of human capital wealth to total wealth (financial plus
human capital wealth). The term (1  pit) reflects the extent to which ‘permanent’
shocks are insurable in a finite horizon model with incomplete markets. For given level
of human capital wealth, past savings imply higher financial wealth today, and hence a
lower value of pit: consumption responds less to income shocks (precautionary saving).
Individuals approaching retirement will have a lower value of p. In the certainty
equivalence version of the PIH, pit ≃ 1 and cLt ≃ 0. This shows the importance of
measuring assets. Without data on the level of net assets it is difficult to accurately
measure pit, and consequently difficult to examine deviations from the simple self-
insurance model.
Blundell et al. (2013) report a number of simulation experiments for this
specification. For reasonable values of parameters, pit declines with age as future
labour income diminishes and assets are built up. A high discount rate discourages
saving as it is more costly in terms of utility for individuals to self-insure. A high
elasticity of intertemporal substitution also discourages saving. All these cases therefore
involve diminished self-insurance and raise pit. High-income growth also reduces the
need for saving as individuals do not want to accumulate savings and move resources
into the future when income is high. Eliminating transitory variance growth raises pit
but not by very much. Introducing a social security pension (equal to half of final
income) raises p and also makes it flatter over the life cycle. Liquidity constraints are
found to have a similar impact.
2.3. When Does Consumption Inequality Measure Welfare Inequality?
We pause at this point and ask whether consumption better reflects household welfare
than does some measure of current income. To do this we define ~Yi as that certain
present discounted value of lifetime income which would allow the individual to
achieve the same expected utility. The consumption stream ~Ci ¼ ~CðEUiÞ that would be
chosen given ~Yi satisfies
X
t
utð ~CitÞ  E
X
t
utðCitÞ
" #
¼ EUi :
11 Introducing higher moments and non-linearities in shocks to the income process will be a key area of
development in future research.
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Suppose we now look at comparisons across individuals facing different income
risk. First, consider the case of Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA)
preferences,
utðCitÞ ¼ at expðctCitÞ at ; ct[ 0; t[ 0:
Blundell and Preston (1998) show that Cit ≥ Cjt implies EUi ≥ EUj whenever
individuals i and j share the same year of birth if and only if Ci ¼ ~CðEUiÞ;
whatever the distribution of future income. What about more reasonable risk
preferences? This result is a special case of a more general result for decreasing
absolute risk aversion preferences that include the more familiar CRRA case (13).
These preferences imply Ci0\ ~Ci0; i.e. that there is ‘excess’ precautionary saving if
higher incomes decrease risk aversion. Consumption overestimates the welfare cost
of income risk.
Neither income nor consumption accurately reflects consumer welfare. In some
circumstances, consumption can be considered an improvement on income. The view
taken here is that consumption and income are both valuable in understanding the
dynamics of inequality and the underlying mechanisms behind changes in inequality.
This is a positive rather than a normative analysis.
3. Partial Insurance
In the partial-insurance approach (Blundell et al., 2008), transmission parameters are
specified that link the shocks to income with consumption growth at the decision
unit level, generalising the self-insurance formulation (18). These transmission
parameters can change across time and may differ across individuals according to
their birth cohorts. They reflect the degree of ‘insurance’ available to individuals
experiencing the income shocks and encompass self-insurance through simple credit
markets as well as other mechanisms used to smooth the impact of labour market
shocks on consumption.
The specification of the transmission parameters will allow the degree of insurance
to differ depending on whether the shock to income is short lived or is persistent. To
quote Deaton and Paxson (1994), ‘one of the main reasons for measuring
consumption inequality and its evolution is to help understand and calibrate the way
in which the economy handles risk’.
In theory it is possible to construct economic environments that insure consumption
fully against idiosyncratic income shocks. This is the perfect insurance case in which
pit = 0. Such economic environments would struggle to be achievable in reality due to
moral hazard and limited enforcement, among other compelling reasons for
incomplete credit markets. Indeed, the assumptions required for complete insurance
have been soundly rejected in careful empirical studies, Attanasio and Davis (1996)
being a leading example. To allow for more general ‘insurance’ mechanisms, Blundell
et al. (2008) introduce ‘partial insurance’. This is designed to capture the possibility of
‘excess insurance’ and also ‘excess sensitivity’.
To understand this approach, first note that the stochastic Euler equation for
consumption growth is consistent with many stochastic processes for consumption. It
does not say anything about the variance of consumption. In the full information
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perfect market model with separable preferences, the variance of consumption growth
is zero. In comparison with the self-insurance model, the intertemporal budget
constraint based on a single asset is violated. Partial insurance allows some, but not full,
additional insurance. For example, Attanasio and Pavoni (2011) consider an economy
with moral hazard and hidden asset accumulation – individuals now have hidden
access to a simple credit market. They show that, depending on the cost of shirking and
the persistence of the income shock, some partial insurance is possible. A linear
insurance rule can be obtained as an ‘exact’ solution in a dynamic Mirrlees model with
CRRA utility.
3.1. Consumption Dynamics with Partial Insurance
To allow for partial insurance, we need to account for additional ‘insurance’
mechanisms and excess sensitivity. For this, Blundell et al. (2008) introduce transmis-
sion parameters /t and wt. For any birth cohort, the consumption growth relationship
(18) is now written as
D lnCit ﬃ Cit þ DZ 0ituc þ nit þ /tfit þ wteit ; (19)
in which partial insurance w.r.t. permanent shocks implies 0 ≤ 1  /t ≤ 1, whereas
partial insurance w.r.t. transitory shocks implies 0 ≤ 1  wt ≤ 1. The expressions
1  /t and 1  wt then measure the fractions insured and subsume pt and ct from
the self-insurance model. With the consumption growth relationship (19), we now
have a (latent) factor structure that provides the panel data moments linking the
evolution of distribution of consumption to the evolution of labour income
distribution. This structure describes how consumption updates in response to
income shocks.
3.2. The Key Panel Data Moments
Taking the models for income dynamics (15) and consumption dynamics (19)
together we can now derive the second-order panel data variances and autocovariances
that serve to identify the unknown transmission parameters, /t and wt, of the
partial-insurance specification. The autocovariance structure for log-adjusted
income growth ðDyt  DlnYt  DZ 0t/yÞ is given in (11). For log consumption
ðDct  Dln Cit ﬃ Cit þ DZ 0itucÞ
covðDct ;DctþsÞ ¼ /2t varðftÞ þ w2t varðetÞ þ varðntÞ (20)
for s = 0 and zero otherwise. For the cross-moments between income and consumption
growth:
covðDct ;DytþsÞ ¼ /tvarðftÞ þ wtvarðetÞwtcovðet ;DvtþsÞ

(21)
for s = 0 and s > 0 respectively. A simple summary of the key panel data moments is
given by
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varðDytÞ ¼ varðftÞ þ varðDetÞ
covðDytþ1;DytÞ ¼ varðetÞ
varðDctÞ ¼ /2t varðftÞ þ w2t varðetÞ þ varðnitÞ þ varðucitÞ
varðDct ;Dcitþ1Þ ¼ varðucitÞ
covðDct ;DytÞ ¼ /tvarðftÞ þ wtvarðetÞ
covðDct ;Dytþ1Þ ¼ wtvarðetÞ
(22)
where ucit is a term reflecting measurement error in the consumption series. There are
six time-varying autocovariances on the right-hand side of (19) and six unknown time-
varying parameters – the two transmission parameters /t and wt, and the four unknown
factor variances varðftÞ; varðetÞ; varðucitÞ and var(ξιt). This leads naturally to a discussion
of identification.12
3.3. Identification
To assess the identification of the transmission parameters in this partial-insurance
specification, consider the simplest model with no measurement error, serially
uncorrelated transitory component and stationarity. The model can be identified with
four years of data (t + 1, t, t  1, t  2). The central parameters to identify are as
follows: /;w; r2n; r
2
f and r
2
e . Standard results imply E½DytðDyt1 þ Dyt þ Dytþ1Þ ¼ r2f and
also that EðDytDyt1Þ ¼ EðDytþ1DytÞ ¼ r2e : Identification of r2e rests on the idea that
income growth rates are autocorrelated due to mean reversion caused by the transitory
component. Identification of r2f rests on the idea that the variance of income growth
[E(Dyt Dyt)], less the contribution of the mean reverting component [E(DytDyt1) +
E(Dyt Dyt+1)], coincides with the permanent innovations. In general, if one has T years
of data, only T  3 variances of the permanent shock can be identified, and only T  2
variances of the i.i.d. transitory shock can be identified.
Blundell et al. (2008) show that identification of the transmission parameter for
transitory shocks (w) uses the fact that income and lagged consumption may be
correlated through the transitory component [EðDctDytþ1Þ ¼ wr2e ]. Scaling this by
EðDytDytþ1Þ ¼ r2e identifies w. There is also a simple IV interpretation: w is identified
by a regression of Dct on Dyt using Dyt+1 as an instrument. A similar reasoning applies to
the permanent shock transmission term /, where the current covariance between
consumption and income growth [E(DctDyt)], stripped of the contribution of the
transitory component, reflects the arrival of permanent income shocks
E½DctðDyt1 þ Dyt þ DytÞ ¼ /r2f :
Scaling this by the variance of permanent income shock, identified by using income
moments alone, identifies the loading factor /. Note again the IV interpretation: / is
identified by a regression of Dct on Dyt using (Dyt1 + Dyt + Dyt+1) as an instrument.
The variance of the component r2n is identified using a residual variability idea: the
variance of consumption growth, stripped of the contribution of permanent and
12 Below we show that under additional assumptions these can also be turned into identifying moments for
repeated cross-section data.
© 2014 The Author(s).
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
2014] I N COME D Y N AM I C S & L I F E - C Y C L E I N E QU A L I T Y 303
transitory income shocks, reflects heterogeneity in the consumption gradient. Blundell
et al. (2008) also show identification in the presence of measurement error.
Measurement error in consumption induces serial correlation in consumption growth.
Because consumption is a martingale with drift in the absence of measurement error,
the variance of measurement error can still be recovered and the other parameters of
interest remain identified. One obvious reason for the presence of measurement error
in consumption occurs if an imputation procedure is used to measure consumption in
the income panel. Note that we would expect such measurement error to be non-
stationary. For measurement error in income, we can show that / and r2uc remain
identified.13
3.4. Non-stationarity
We have already seen that allowing for non-stationarity is likely to be empirically
important. Suppose we have T years of data, then
E½DysðDys1 þ Dys þ Dysþ1Þ ¼ r2f;s
for s = 3, 4, . . . , T  1. The variance of the transitory shock can be identified using:
EðDysDysþ1Þ ¼ r2e;s
for s = 2, 3, . . . , T  1. In the case of time-varying partial-insurance parameters,
identification is achieved through moment conditions
EðDcsDysþ1Þ
EðDysDysþ1Þ ¼ ws
and
E Dcs Dys1 þ Dys þ Dysþ1ð Þ½ 
E Dys Dys1 þ Dys þ Dysþ1ð Þ½  ¼ /s
for all s = 2, 3, . . . , T  1 and s = 3, 4, . . . ,T  2 respectively.
3.5. What can we Learn from Repeated Cross Sections?
Historically many countries have collected income and expenditure surveys that have
no (or very little) longitudinal structure.14 This is true for the Family Expenditure
Survey (FES) in the UK, the Consumers Expenditure Survey (CEX) in the US, Family
Expenditure Survey (FAMEX) in Canada, Budget de Famille in France, Household
Expenditure Survey (HES) in Australia and the National Survey of Family Income and
Expenditure (NSFIE) in Japan. Even without panel data, is it still possible to learn
about the importance of permanent shocks?
With repeated cross-section measurements of income alone we cannot distinguish
permanent from transitory income shocks, let alone identify the evolution of those
13 Blundell et al. (2008) note that for the PSID, a back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the variance of
measurement error in earnings accounts for approximately 30% of the variance of the overall transitory
component of earnings.
14 The primary motivation for the data collection in these cases stemmed from the requirement to
construct consumer price indices.
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variances and the insurance parameters. However, adding measurements on consump-
tion, and strengthening our assumptions somewhat, Blundell and Preston (1998) show
that we can identify both. Indeed, with measurements of consumption and income in
the same survey, we can identify the insurance parameter on permanent shocks as well
as the evolution of permanent and transitory income shock variances.
To see how this insight works, assume the cross-sectional covariances of the shocks
with previous periods’ incomes are zero and the annuitisation value of transitory
shocks is negligible. The variance–covariance structure now (18) has the form
DVarðytÞ ¼ VarðftÞ þ DVarðetÞ
DVarðctÞ ¼ /2t VarðftÞ þ OðEt1kmitk3Þ
DCovðct ; ytÞ ¼ /tVarðftÞ þ OðEt1kmitk3Þ:
(23)
These moments can be used to identify Var(ft), DVar(et) and /t. This is the approach
taken in Blundell et al. (2013) for the repeated cross sections of income and
consumer surveys in the UK. They report a transmission parameter for permanent
shocks /t that is stable over this period and takes on values around 0.8. They also use
this approach to show for birth cohorts, who are in the labour market in the UK
during the 1980s, that there is a strong spike in the variance of the permanent shocks
at the depth of the recession.
3.6. Partial-insurance Parameters for the US
The PSID was the first household panel data study to systematically collect longitudinal
data on family incomes, extensive demographic variables and some items of consump-
tion at frequent intervals. It became a key data source for examining various measures
of inequality up until the early 1990s. Taking on a central place in the studying of
income especially following the huge run-up in income inequality in the US during the
1980s, documented the ground-breaking study of Moffitt and Gottschalk (1994), for
example. In the late 1990s, the PSID was extensively revamped, moving from an annual
to a biennial panel and increasing its collection of asset and consumption data. We
return to the exploration of this remarkable new data below. But for the study of the
1980s inequality boom, the original panel survey provides compelling evidence.
The results summarised here refer to the PSID sample used in Blundell et al. (2008)
covering the period 1978–1992 and consisting of all the possible subpanels of
5 ≤ length ≤ 15 years for households with a male head aged 30–60. For the
consumption data, a series from the CEX was drawn using the 1980–1992 surveys.
The CEX collects information on a variety of socio-demographic and economic
variables that are also collected in the PSID. Expenditure in the CEX is reported in
each quarter and refers to the previous quarter; income is reported in the second and
fifth interview (with some exceptions), and refers to the previous 12 months. For
consistency with the timing of consumption, fifth-quarter income data are used.
Although the CEX is a quarterly panel, it consists of four quarters only and the
income data are only freshly surveyed in the first and fourth quarters. Rather than using
this data directly, a structural inverse demand equation with time-varying parameters is
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used to link the two data sources. The PSID contains a measure of total food
expenditures. To line up the measures as best as is possible, five-quarter respondents
only (annual expenditure measures) from the CEX are utilised. Otherwise, the sample
selection is similar to that for the PSID. Further detail of this approach and a
comparison of both data sources are in Blundell et al. (2004), which builds on the
earlier work of Skinner (1987). Table 3 presents the implied autocovariance structure
between consumption and income growth.
Table 4 provides the estimates of the partial-insurance parameters / and w from (19)
for the baseline specification. It also shows results for specifications which allow the
Table 3
The Autocovariance Matrix of Consumption Growth in the US
Year var(Dct) cov(Dct+1,Dct) cov(Dct+2,Dct)
1980 0.1275 0.0526 0.0022
(0.0097) (0.0076) (0.0056)
1981 0.1197 0.0573 0.0025
(0.0116) (0.0084) (0.0043)
1982 0.1322 0.0641 0.0006
(0.0110) (0.0087) (0.0060)
1983 0.1532 0.0691 0.0056
(0.0159) (0.0100) (0.0067)
1984 0.1869 0.1003 0.0131
(0.0173) (0.0163) (0.0089)
1985 0.2019 0.0872 NA
(0.0244) (0.0194)
1986 0.1628 NA NA
(0.0184)
1987 NA NA NA
1988 NA NA NA
1989 NA NA NA
1990 0.1751 0.0602 0.0057
(0.0221) (0.0062) (0.0067)
1991 0.1646 0.0696 NA
(0.0142) (0.0100)
1992 0.1467 NA NA
(0.0130)
Source. Blundell et al. (2008).
Table 4
Partial-insurance Parameter Estimates
Transmission parameters Whole sample No college College Born 1940s Born 1930s
/(Partial-insurance permanent shock) 0.6423 0.9439 0.4194 0.7928 0.6889
(0.0945) (0.1783) (0.0924) (0.1848) (0.2393)
w(Partial-insurance transitory shock) 0.0533 0.0768 0.0675 0.0273 0.0381
(0.0435) (0.0602) (0.0550) (0.0705) (0.0737)
p-value test of equal / 0.23 0.99 0.08 0.81 0.18
p-value test of equal w 0.75 0.33 0.29 0.76 0.04
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. This Table reports DWMD results of the parameters of interest. See
Blundell et al. (2008) for results allowing for time-varying variances of measurement error in consumption.
Source. Blundell et al. (2008).
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transmission parameters to differ by birth cohort and by education level. Overall, the
results suggest around 65% of permanent income shocks are not insured; that is, they
find their way directly into consumption. Virtually, all transitory shocks appear to be
insured. As we will see below, using direct measures of household assets and also
allowing for family labour supply responses provide clear new insights into these
baseline partial-insurance results.
3.7. The Importance of Measuring Assets
The PSID over the 1978–92 period contained some broad measures of financial and
housing wealth. Combining these and selecting households with (initial) wealth in the
lowest 30% of the wealth distribution is found to imply a very different pattern of
transmission parameters. The second column of results in Table 5 shows the impact on
this selection by initial wealth. Comparing with the baseline specification reproduced
in column 1, these results show a larger point estimate for the transmission of
permanent shocks and, more importantly perhaps, a strongly significant transmission
parameter for transitory shocks. Unsurprisingly, with limited access to financial or
housing wealth, even transitory shocks to income impact on consumption. Column 3
shows this is not the case for the higher wealth group.
If borrowing at, or close to, the risk-free rate is difficult, families can experience
welfare loss even for short-run falls in income reflected in the consequent reduction
in consumption. However, as Browning and Crossley (2009) so elegantly note, the
service flow from durable consumption can be maintained by running down durables
and holding back on replacement or maintenance. Any fall in non-durable
consumption can thereby be attenuated, at least for a short while. The upshot of
this is that we would expect to find even greater sensitivity to transitory income
shocks among low-wealth households for consumption measures that include durable
purchases.
To assess the importance of this mechanism for low-wealth families, we can
examine the same selection of low-wealth households but now include durable
expenditures in our consumption measure. In the final column in Table 5, the
transmission parameter for transitory shocks is now even larger than column 2 and
the permanent shock parameter has a point estimate of unity. Once durable
expenditures are included, consumption growth is even more sensitive to transitory
Table 5
Wealth and Durables
Consumption: Non-durable Non-durable Non-durable Total
Income: Net income Net income Net income Net income
Sample: Baseline Low wealth High wealth Low wealth
/ (Partial-insurance permanent shock) 0.6423 0.8489 0.6248 1.0342
(0.0945) (0.2848) (0.0999) (0.3517)
w (Partial-insurance transitory shock) 0.0533 0.2877 0.0106 0.3683
(0.0435) (0.1143) (0.0414) (0.1465)
Note. See Table 4.
© 2014 The Author(s).
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
2014] I N COME D Y N AM I C S & L I F E - C Y C L E I N E QU A L I T Y 307
shocks for low-wealth families. As noted in the discussion of the partial-insurance
model (19), the transmission parameters subsume self-insurance and do not allow us
to separate the various insurance mechanisms. If we could accurately measure p for
each family in the survey, this would allow this distinction. The enhanced asset data
in the recent PSID data allow us to investigate these points in more detail in Section
4 below.
3.8. Excess Insurance?
The 65% insurance of permanent income shocks result is a somewhat puzzling and
controversial result. It implies that around 35% of permanent shocks do not find their
way into consumption. This is substantially in excess of what would be reasonably
accommodated by the rough measures of savings for families in the PSID over this
period, suggesting additional insurance mechanisms over and above simple self-
insurance.
We have already seen that this ‘average’ result is very sensitive to the inclusion of
low-wealth households even when using the rough measures of wealth in the PSID
surveys from the early 1980s. We might also want to compare across education groups.
For example, in the college/no-college comparison, the estimates from Blundell et al.
(2008) suggest that low-education groups failed to insure almost any permanent
income shocks. As also might be expected, in a comparison of younger versus older
birth cohorts, the older cohort was able to insure more.
The ‘excess insurance’ result also provided a strong motivation for the Blundell et al.
(2012) to which we turn to in the next section. This study uses the recently enhanced
PSID data on assets, consumption and labour supply, to dig further into possible
‘insurance’ mechanisms.
3.9. Inequality During the Recession
The Blundell et al. (2008) results also suggest a sharp rise in the variance of permanent
shocks in the early 1980s, coincident with the recession in the US. The estimated
variance of transitory shocks continued to rise through the middle of the decade but by
that time the importance of permanent shocks declined. There is little evidence of
changes in the / and w transmission parameters over time, suggesting that the degree
of insurance was fairly stable over this period.15
These results on inequality during the recession coincide with those for the UK over
the 1980s. For this period there is no household panel data available in the UK, so
Blundell et al. (2013) follow the approach for the repeated cross sections of income
and consumer surveys described earlier. As noted above, they report a transmission
parameter for permanent shocks / that is stable over this period and takes on values
around 0.8. For birth cohorts who are in their early and prime-age working lives during
the 1980s, they document a strong spike in the variance of the permanent shocks at the
depth of the recession.
15 They do find a strong rejection of constancy when food in PSID is used, driven by food becoming more
of a necessity over this period.
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4. Additional ‘Insurance’ Mechanisms
Overall we can think of four types of insurance we might wish to consider: Self-
insurance through the credit market; social insurance through taxes and welfare
benefits; family labour supply through the labour supply responses of other family
members and informal contracts, gifts, etc. The transmission parameter approach
taken in the partial-insurance model specifications above combines all these mech-
anisms into single transmission parameters. It does not therefore allow the separation
of the different mechanisms involved.
4.1. Taxes and Transfers
Understanding the degree to which taxes and transfer programmes act as insurance for
permanent and transitory income shocks among the poor is important in assessing
their effectiveness and their design. There exists an important empirical literature on
redistributive mechanisms provided by social insurance, transfers, progressive taxation
which include Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), Gruber (2000), Kniesner and Ziliak (2002)
and Blundell and Pistaferri (2003). There are also studies on informal transfers within
extended families and across interpersonal networks; for example, Kotlikoff and Spivak
(1981) and Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000).
A simple way to assess the ‘insurance’ value of the tax and transfer system in the
context of the partial-insurance approach is to examine the impact on the insurance
parameters of changing the income definition to be gross of taxes and transfers. A
reduction in the transmission parameters would indicate the degree of additional
insurance. The second column of Table 6 shows the results of such an experiment
using the partial-insurance modelling framework and PSID–CEX data source analysis
above. The reduction in the estimated transmission parameter for permanent shocks /
from 0.64 to 0.37 indicates the important role of taxes and transfers in insuring family
incomes. The final column points to the importance of family labour supply to which
we now turn.
4.2. Family Labour Supply
Perhaps one of the most interesting avenues of ‘insurance’ within families is the use of
family labour supply. Family labour supply acts as a natural mechanism for smoothing
income to permanent wage across different family members, see Stephens (2009),
Table 6
Taxation and Other Earnings
Consumption: Non-durable Non-durable Non-durable
Income: Net income Earnings only Male earnings
/ (Partial-insurance permanent shock) 0.6423 0.3700 0.2245
(0.0945) (0.0574) (0.0493)
w (Partial-insurance transitory shock) 0.0533 0.0633 0.0502
(0.0435) (0.0309) (0.0294)
Note. See Table 4.
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Attanasio et al. (2005, 2008), Heathcote et al. (2007), Lise and Seitz (2011). Moreover,
family labour supply may be used as an insurance to transitory shocks in the absence of
access to credit. It is inefficient for one family member to use their labour supply to
insure transitory shocks to another family members wages when the family can access
credit. But this is not so when there are borrowing constraints or frictions in the credit
market.
To introduce family labour supply behaviour consider total income Yt as the sum of
two sources, Y1t and Y2t  W2th2t. Assume that the labour supplied by the primary
earner to be fixed, so that it is the secondary worker who has flexibility in labour supply
h2 in response to shocks in wages W2 and the primary worker’s income Y1.
To keep things manageable, assume that the primary income Y1 and the hourly wage
rate of the secondary worker W2t follow the simple permanent–transitory structure
D lnY1t ¼ c1t þ Du1t þ v1t ;
and
D lnW2t ¼ c2t þ Du2t þ v2t :
respectively. Household decisions are taken to maximise a household utility function
X
k
ð1þ dÞk ½U ðCtþkÞ  V ðh2;tþkÞ:
Using the same approach as in the pure consumption model above the consumption
growth and intertemporal labour supply equations
D lnCtþk ’ rtþkD ln ktþk
D ln h2;tþk ’ qtþkðD ln ktþk þ D lnW2;tþkÞ;
where k is the marginal utility of wealth and where rt  U 0t =CtU 00t \ 0 and
qt  V 0t =h2tV 00t [ 0: In this formulation, the interest rate and discount rates have
been set equal to focus on the wage and income effects.16
These stochastic growth relationships for lnC, lnY1, lnY2 and lnW2 imply a specific
variance–covariance structure. This structure generates the key panel data moments:
VarðDctÞ ’ b2r2s2Varðv1tÞ þ b2r2ð1 qÞ2ð1 sÞ2Varðv2tÞ
þ 2b2r2ð1 qÞsð1 sÞCovðv1t ; v2tÞ
VarðDy1tÞ ’ Varðv1tÞ þ DVarðu1tÞ
VarðDy2tÞ ’ ð1 wÞ2Varðu2tÞ  b2q2s2Varðv1tÞ
þ b2r2ð1 qÞ2Varðv2tÞ  2b2rð1 qÞsCovðv1t ; v2tÞ
VarðDw2tÞ ’ Varðv2tÞ þ DVarðu2tÞ;
where b = 1/[r + q(1  s)] and st is the ratio of the mean value of the primary
earner’s earnings to that of the household Y1t= Yt : These moments are sufficient to
identify permanent and transitory shock distribution for ln Y1 and W2, and their the
16 See Attanasio et al. (2002).
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evolution over time. Note that when there is a positive labour supply elasticity q > 0,
then the secondary worker provides insurance for permanent shocks to Y1.
The last two columns of Table 6 show the impact of moving from a total family
earnings measure to a male (Head) earnings measure for their sample of PSID
couples. The fall in the transmission parameter for permanent shocks / from 0.37 to
0.225 shows the importance of family labour supply in insuring permanent shocks to
male earnings in this period.
In the pure self-insurance framework where consumption smoothing is provided
through borrowing and saving at the risk-free rate, although the secondary worker’s
labour supply responds positively to her own transitory wage shocks, she (or he) does
not respond to transitory shocks to primary worker income. It is always preferable for
the family to use the credit market to smooth such transitory shocks. However, when
credit at the risk-free rate is not available, transitory shocks to primary incomes will be
insured by secondary worker labour supply.
To investigate the family labour supply story further, Blundell et al. (2012) use the
enhanced data from the post-1996 PSID to estimate a model of consumption inequality
and family labour supply for couples. The new asset data allow a direct measure of pit
and the more comprehensive consumption data avoid the need for imputation. Their
analysis extends previous work and expresses the distributional dynamics of consump-
tion and earnings growth as functions of Frisch elasticities, ‘insurance parameters’ and
wage shocks.
For example, the impact of a permanent shock to male wages wm is shown to
generalise the transmission parameter pi,t in expression (18) to take the form:
pi;t si;m;t
gc;p 1þ ghm ;wm
 
gc;p þ 1 pi;t
 
gh;w
; (24)
where si,m,t is the share of the male earnings in future human capital wealth, and the
gc,p and gh,w parameters are the Frisch consumption and hours of work elasticities
respectively.17 Consequently, this new transmission parameter (24) captures the impact
of a permanent wage shock on consumption allowing for family labour supply
responses, savings and risk aversion.
The expression (24) assumes additive separability between consumption and labour
supply, something strongly rejected in the Blundell et al. (2012) study. Once this
assumption is relaxed, the generalised partial-insurance specification is shown to fit the
dynamics of wages, earnings and consumption well and implies some remarkably clear
predictions for the different insurance mechanisms over the life-cycle emerge.
For example, one key contribution of this approach is summarised in Figure 6 which
describes the average estimated response of consumption to a 10% permanent
decrease in the male’s wage rate at different ages (of the household head). As the male
share of earnings is around 70%, the impact without accounting for family labour
supply or self-insurance is around 7%. This impact on consumption is reduced
considerably once family labour supply and self-insurance are accounted for.
17 Note that the definition of p used in Blundell et al. (2012) is the ratio of assets to assets plus human
capital wealth. Consequently, the measure is 1 the measure of p here.
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At younger working ages, say, those in their 30s, all the impact is through family
labour supply responses. Few households at this point in their life cycle have built up
enough savings to be of use in insuring permanent labour income shocks. But the
labour supply of their family members can respond and does so to cut the average
impact on consumption to 4% on average. It is not until older working ages that
assets play a role. Figure 6 also shows that at older working ages, say in the late 50s, the
average impact is further reduced to below 3%. The adjustment is shared evenly
between the use of savings and family labour supply.
Of course, and as documented in the article, there is much heterogeneity in the
response to permanent shocks across household types according to their assets,
education, demographics, labour market attachment etc. This analysis suggests that
family labour supply can be a key mechanism for insuring idiosyncratic labour market
shocks for couples, especially for those with limited access to assets.
5. Robustness Issues
There are many issues surrounding the robustness of the results presented above.
There are information and anticipation issues. Among these are the consumer’s ability
to distinguish between permanent and transitory shocks and the degree of anticipation
or advance information of income ‘shocks’. Then, there are issues around the
robustness to assumptions about the nature of the economy; in particular, to
assumptions about the non-stationarity of the income distribution and also to
assumptions about the credit market and borrowing constraints. I briefly consider each
of these in turn.
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Fig. 6. The Average Impact on Consumption of a Permanent Shock to Male Wage, US
Source. Blundell et al. (2012).
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5.1. Distinguishing Permanent from Transitory Shocks
Suppose we return to the partial-insurance model which ignores labour supply (19)
and suppose that the consumer cannot separately identify transitory eit from
permanent fit income shocks. For a consumer who simply observed the income
innovation eit in yit = yi,t1 + eit  htei,t1, we have consumption innovation:
git ¼ qtð1 htþ1Þeit þ
r
1þ r htþ1eit ; (25)
where qt = 1  (1 + r)(Rt+1). The evolution of ht is directly related to the evolution
of the variances of the transitory and permanent innovations to income; see Blundell
and Preston (1998).
The permanent effects component in this decomposition can be thought of as
capturing news about both current and past permanent effects as
E
X
j¼0
fi;tj jeit ; ei;t1; . . .
 !
 E
X
j¼0
fi;tj jei;t1; . . .
 !
¼ ð1 htþ1Þeit :
This represents the best prediction of the permanent/transitory split.
Suppose instead that the researcher decides to ignore the split between the two
shocks. The partial-insurance coefficient is now a weighted average of the coefficients
of partial insurance / and w, with weights given by the importance of the variance of
permanent (transitory) shocks. In a period where the importance of permanent shocks
is declining such as the mid to late 1980s, one would have the impression that
insurance is growing. Instead, it is the relative importance of more insurable shocks
that is growing.
5.2. Anticipation and Information
The overlap between the econometrician’s information set and that of the consumer is
likely to be far from exact, see Cunha et al. (2005), for example. The ‘shocks’ to
income may well already be known to the consumer. In this case, the transmission
parameter will subsume the advance information available to the consumer. What
appears to be insurance may just reflect advance information.
One way to assess the extent of advance information is to examine the covariances
between current consumption growth and future income growth. If information
arrives and consumers act on this, it should be immediately included in consumption.
For the 1978–92 US panel data in Blundell et al. (2008), we find little evidence of
significant anticipation. The p-value for the test cov(Dyt+1,Dct) = 0 for all time periods
is 0.3305, and for the next three higher order covariances, the p-values are even larger,
0.6058, 0.8247 and 0.7752 respectively. This ‘suggests’ that the shocks that were
experienced in the US in the 1980s for this PSID sample of prime-age headed families
can be interpreted as largely unanticipated. In the US and in the UK, it seems sensible
to conclude that the key dominant changes in earnings inequality over this period
reflected three changes – shifts in the returns to skills, shifts in government transfers
and the shift of insurance from firms to workers; see Machin and Van Reenen (2008).
It is difficult to argue that these were easily anticipated by consumers.
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5.3. Alternative ‘Economies’
The simulation studies reported in Kaplan and Violante (2010) and Blundell et al.
(2013) examine various aspects of the economic assumptions underlying the partial-
insurance approach. Both studies simulate a baseline life-cycle version of the
incomplete markets model in which households have access to a single risk-free bond
and have time-separable expected CRRA utility; see Huggett (1993).
Blundell et al. (2013) focus on a non-stationary economy where the permanent
variance follows a two-state, first-order Markov process with the transition probability
between alternative variances. The aim is to see how well the evolution of the variances
and covariances, especially in the case of repeated cross-section data, identifies the
changes in the permanent and transitory variances in this non-stationarity Markov
switching model. They show that under a wide range of assumptions on income
processes, discount rates and substitution elasticities, reasonably accurate estimates of
the variances and their changes over time can be inferred from the evolution of
consumption and income inequality.
The important Kaplan and Violante (2010) study focuses more on the nature of the
insurance available ranging between an incomplete markets framework with borrowing
constraints, the Permanent Income model and an autarky framework, all in a stationary
setting. They also consider advance information, where a proportion of the shocks are
known in advance to the consumer and also where returns from human capital are
known and correlated with initial conditions. They find that the transmission
parameter approach does well in most of the situations considered, although the
interpretation of the transmission parameters as measures of insurance depends on
assumptions about information and the persistence of shocks. Perhaps most interest-
ingly, their study highlights the importance of specifying the income dynamics
correctly when assessing whether the standard self-insurance model accords well with
the data. As noted above, excess insurance can simply reflect a lower persistence in the
shocks to income. Guvenen (2007) investigates this further in a useful and creative
generalisation of the consumption growth model with persistent income dynamics, as
in (5), but where individuals learn about their idiosyncratic trends.
6. Summary and Future Directions
The research reported in this study seeks to understand the transmission of inequality
over the working life. Taking labour market shocks as the primary source of
uncertainty, the aim is to examine the linkages between the distribution of wages,
earnings, joint labour supply, savings and consumption. A large variety of ‘insurance’
mechanisms that link these various measures are considered, including credit markets,
labour supply, taxation, welfare benefits, formal insurance, informal gifts and transfers.
The key idea is to use the framework of constrained intertemporal choice to provide a
structure for the distributional dynamics of inequality over the working life.
The dynamics of labour income and wages are a central part of this analysis and
much of the discussion in the article is on understanding the nature of labour market
income dynamics. These dynamics have been shown to be the key to exploring the
mechanisms used by families to ‘insure’ against labour market shocks.
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The definition of insurance that we have adopted is very broad. It covers formal and
informal mechanisms that are used to attenuate the impact of shocks to income. These
mechanisms have been found to vary in importance across different types of
households at different points of their life cycle and at different points in time: The
manner and scope for insurance depending on the access to credit, the durability of
income shocks and the ability of other family members to adjust their labour supply.
The workhorse framework used has been the standard incomplete markets self-
insurance model generalised to a partial-insurance framework developed in Blundell
et al. (2008), in which transmission parameters are used to indicate the degree of
insurance to labour market shocks.
Gathering up the results, I have uncovered clear evidence for non-stationarity over
the life cycle and over time. Variances (of persistent shocks) tend to be larger at the
beginning and at the end of the working life. Recessions also often result in spikes in
the variances of shocks. For most families, the partial-insurance framework points to a
large pass through of longer term ‘persistent’ shocks to consumption, this is the key
link between the income and consumption distributions. For low-wealth households,
however, shorter term ‘transitory’ shocks provide an important additional linkage.
Recent work in this area has also found that family labour supply is an important
mechanism for smoothing consumption, especially for those with limited net assets.
Indeed, Blundell et al. (2012) argue that once family labour supply, assets and taxes
(and benefits) are properly accounted for, there is little evidence for additional
insurance. Together, these results resolve many of the puzzles and controversies in the
empirical literature as to exactly how best to develop the microfoundations of the
simple permanent income model that allows for a more realistic setting for household
behaviour.
What of future research?: There remains much to be done to dig deeper into the
underlying stochastic processes and the different insurance mechanisms. In particular,
exploring the role of idiosyncratic trends, non-stationarity, higher order moments and
nonlinearities in the income process. Relaxing the inherent linearity assumptions,
underlying most dynamic panel data models of labour income will be a key
development in this research. These have the potential to impact strongly on
consumption decisions. Heterogeneous trends can lead to an exaggeration of the
importance of persistent shocks; see Guvenen and Smith (2012).18 Higher order
moments and non-linearities in persistent shocks increasing in importance the larger
the degree of risk aversion.
There is also the need to understand further the mechanism and market incentives
for insurance, here the key articles to date have been Krueger and Perri (2006) and
Attanasio and Pavoni (2011). Related to this is the importance of advance information
and learning along the life cycle. The study by Cunha et al. (2005) is central in this
respect.
Finally, there is much more to be done on the interaction between credit, durable
expenditures and family labour supply. How does the irreversibility of durable
purchase decisions interact with uncertainty? Which goods are complementary and
18 Even so, the evolution of variance of consumption can still be used to identify the variance of
permanent shocks; see Blundell et al. (2013).
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which are substitutes for labour supply? How important is the degree of liquidity of
housing and financial wealth in insuring against shocks? What happens when shocks in
the labour market and asset markets are correlated, much as was the case in the recent
financial recession? The models developed here suggest a magnified transmission
effect as lower asset values provide less ability for self-insurance and correlated labour
market shocks providing less opportunity for insurance through family labour supply.
One thing is for sure, the results of the research presented here provide a strong
motivation for collecting consumption data, along with asset and earnings data, in new
longitudinal household surveys and linked administrative register data.
University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies
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